Fourth Circuit

Immigration

S-W-P v. Garland (22-)

Questions Presented

Whether commercial sex between consenting adults (e.g., prostitution) qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude.

Clinic

University of Maryland Federal Appellate Immigration Clinic

Briefing

Amicus Brief on Behalf of Sex Workers Project of Urban Justice Center.

Result

Pending.

Galvan v. Garland (20-1485)

Questions Presented

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), whether Galvan failed to prove that his removal would impose an “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on his United States citizen children.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Result

Affirmed, Petition Denied. The government challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to consider Galvan’s petition for review. They argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) prohibited judicial review of an Immigration Judge’s discretionary decision denying cancellation of removal. Fourth Circuit disagreed, however, finding that, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020), Galvan’s claim was a matter of “mixed fact and law.” While the ultimate decision on granting cancellation of removal is discretionary, the determination of whether the applicant meets the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” requirement under INA is a question of law that can be reviewed by the Court. Fourth Circuit held that they could not review the IJ’s factual findings but could review the application of those facts to the statutory legal standard. The court found that the IJ “applied the correct standard, considered the evidence, and adequately explained the reasons for the denial.” Therefore, they did not err when they denied Galvan’s petition for review. Fourth Circuit ultimately affirmed.

Orellana-Torres v. Garland (20-1162)

Questions Presented

Whether the BIA erred in finding that Orellana-Torres did not establish past persecution based on political opinion for purposes of his asylum and withholding claims.
Whether the BIA used an improper standard of review in reviewing his CAT claim.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Result

Affirmed, Petition Denied. Fourth Circuit found that Orellana-Torres had to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground by an organization that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to control. Orellana-Torres primarily argued that the harm he suffered in El Salvador, as described in his testimony, constituted past persecution. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed, stating that he had not met the necessary criteria for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA found that the harm he suffered did not rise to the level of “persecution.” Fourth Circuit upheld the BIA’s decision, stating that Orellana-Torres did not present compelling evidence of persecution, and the harm he suffered did not meet the threshold of “severe physical abuse or torture.” Fourth Circuit also considered Orellana-Torres’s claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and found that he had not established a likelihood of future torture. Fourth Circuit denied Orellana-Torres’s petition for review.

Seivwright v. Barr (18-2499)

Questions Presented

Nicholas Avaskar Seivwright, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review of an order of the BIA denying Seivwright’s motion to reopen his removal proceedings.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Result

Dismissed. Fourth Circuit dismissed Seivwright’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Fourth Circuit explained that it lacked jurisdiction to consider most of the issues raised because Seivwright did not contest his alien status or removability for aggravated felonies, and the issues raised did not present constitutional claims or colorable issues of law. Fourth Circuit also stated that they generally lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s exercise of sua sponte discretion, and Seivwright had failed to establish any exceptions that would apply. As a result, they dismissed the petition for review and dispensed with oral argument, as the facts and legal contentions were adequately presented in the case materials.

Cabrera v. Barr (18-1314)

Questions Presented

Whether the BIA erred in determining that the gang-related offense prohibited under Va. Code § 18.2-46.2 categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Fourth Circuit held that Cabrera had exhausted his administrative remedies, and, for that reason, the Court had jurisdiction to hear Cabrera’s case. Fourth Circuit also concluded that participating in criminal street gang activity was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the mere fact that someone was involved with a street gang does not necessarily mean that their actions constituted a crime involving moral turpitude consistent with requirements for removal. For these reasons, Fourth Circuit granted Cabrera’s petition for review, vacated the order of removal issued by the BIA, and remanded.

Prisoner Plaintiff

Wall v. Rasnick (21-6553)

Question Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion in upholding the magistrate judge’s order denying sanctions against the defendants for the spoliation of video evidence.
Whether the district court clearly erred in relying on the remaining, incomplete video evidence to credit the defendants’ testimony over Mr. Wall’s.
Whether defendant-counterclaimant Elijah Rasnick’s failure to present evidence that Mr. Wall struck him or created any apprehension of an imminent battery requires reversal of the district court’s finding that Mr. Wall assaulted and battered him.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Fourth Circuit found that Wall’s handwritten objects were timely and sufficient with the understanding that pro se litigants are granted more leeway than other litigants with counsel; therefore, the district court should have considered them. Fourth Circuit also found that the district court’s failure to consider Wall’s objections only became relevant upon the final order of the district court–which Wall immediately appealed. Wall’s spoliation-sanctions objection was preserved for appeal. Fourth Circuit held that a court filing a final judgement and failing to rule on pending objections functioned as the court overruling those objections. However, the district court’s overruling was held to be an abuse of discretion because the judge failed to provide any reasoning or insight into her ruling. Fourth Circuit vacated the order of the district court entering judgement to the defendants and remanded for a hearing on Wall’s objections to the denial of the spoliation sanctions.

Tate v. Harmon (21-6109)

Question Presented

In Carlson v. Green, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a Bivens action for an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim premised on prison officials’ failure to provide adequate medical care. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized a Bivens action for an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim premised on prison officials’ failure to protect an inmate from a known risk of violence.

Can Mr. Tate bring a Bivens action for an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim premised on prison officials’ failure to provide constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement and for their deliberately exposing him to the risk of physical harm?

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that district court properly dismissed action, because plaintiff could not proceed with Bivens action.

Coleman v. Jones (20-7382)

Questions Presented

Defendants refused to allow appellant, a devout Muslim, to elect the Kosher diet that is available to Jewish inmates and that appellant sincerely believes would satisfy the requirements of his Islamic faith. Instead, defendants insisted that appellant either violate his religion by eating the general prison diet, or eat an all vegetarian diet designed to satisfy a broad range of unrelated religions that restrict or prohibit the consumption of meat. The district court held that the record presents a triable case that defendants violated the Equal Protection, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, as well as their Virginia counterparts. The court nonetheless held that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

The issues on appeal are:

Whether a finding that defendants acted out of religious animus or intentional discrimination would preclude qualified immunity.
Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on appellant’s Free Exercise claim, when they offer no real penological justification for their actions and there were easy and obvious ways to accommodate his needs.
Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on appellant’s Establishment Clause claim, when they persisted in implementing differential treatment for Jewish and Muslim inmates with no penological justification.
Whether defendants are entitled to official immunity under Virginia law for appellant’s claims arising under the Virginia constitution.

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit reversed district court because plaintiff sufficiently and plausibly alleged health consequences, because the record evidence would support an inference of intentional discrimination, and because the standard for qualified immunity under Virginia constitutional law is not the same as the federal standard.

Freeman v. Deas (20-7345)

Question Presented

Whether the district erred in concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Officer Deas used excessive force when he repeatedly punched Mr. Freeman.
Whether the district court erred in finding that no reasonable officer would have recognized that Officer Deas’ actions violated Mr. Freeman’s clearly established Eighth Amendment rights.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Pending.

Firewalker-Fields v. Albertson (20-6884)

Question Presented

Whether Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Mr. Firewalker-Fields’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to a probation condition that prohibits him from attending religious services.
Whether Mr. Firewalker-Fields, a practicing Muslim, stated a Free Exercise claim under § 1983 when he alleged that his probation officer prohibited him from attending religious services.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Remanded. The case was removed from the oral arguments calendar and remanded to the district court to consider Albertson’s statute-of-limitations defense.

Parrish v. United States (20-1766)

Question Presented

Does a district court’s grant of a reopening of the time to file an appeal under FRAP 4(a)(6) validate an appellant’s earlier filed notice of appeal without the need for a second notice?
Does Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), apply to Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) claims and, if so, did Heck toll the statute of limitations until Parrish was exonerated?
Does the prison mailbox rule apply to FTCA claims and, if so, is Parrish entitled to a remand to resolve disputed issues of fact?
Does 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) require plaintiffs to both file a claim before the appropriate agency within two years and bring an action within six months of the agency’s denial?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Dismissed. Fourth Circuit dismissed Parrish’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Parrish did not file in a timely manner. After filing his appeal late, which he argued was because he didn’t receive the district court’s judgment until 93 days after it was issued (3 days after the period to file a timely appeal had ended), Fourth Circuit received his untimely notice of appeal as a motion to reopen the filing period and remanded to the district court which held that Parrish had 14 days to file a notice; Parrish, however, failed to file his appeal within this timeframe. Parrish argued that, pursuant to § 2107(b), his motion and his notice were one in the same. Fourth Circuit, however, found that the only exception for a late filing which Parrish could use fell under § 2107(c) which “provide[d] for a new 14-day window” but was not an extension of the 90 day window Parrish already had. Because this was a new window and because the district court stated that they were “reopening” the time “for 14 days following the entry,” Parrish was required to file an appeal within the new time frame as opposed to relying on his previous, untimely motion which had already been filed. Fourth Circuit held that “the times specified by statute for filing appeals in civil actions are jurisdictional” which would prevent Fourth Circuit from having jurisdiction in a situation wherein an appellant failed to file his brief in a timely matter; a decision which the Supreme Court has upheld “strictly” in the past. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).

Firewalker-Fields v. Lee (19-7497)

Questions Presented

This constitutional civil rights action challenges policies of the Middle River Regional Jail in Staunton, Virginia. The issues are:

Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Free Exercise claim, when a reasonable trier of fact could find that defendants’ security and resource justifications for refusing to accommodate the religious needs of Muslim inmates were exaggerated and ignored obvious alternatives.
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Establishment Clause claim, when the record shows a triable issue that defendants’ practice of broadcasting sectarian Christian worship services in the “day rooms” during lockdown hours on Sundays imposes inappropriate burdens on non-Christian inmates and fails to treat different faiths in a neutral manner.

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part, reversed in part (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Free Exercise Clause claim, but reversed and remanded for further proceedings on Establishment Clause claim.

Desper v. Clarke (19-7346)

Question Presented

Whether Mr. Desper’s allegations that prison officials indefinitely denied him all visitation with his minor daughter for no specific reason stated a plausible claim for a violation of his right to intimate familial association under the First Amendment.
Whether Mr. Desper’s allegations that prison officials arbitrarily infringed on his parent-child relationship by denying him all visitation with his minor daughter while giving him no opportunity to learn or challenge their reasons for doing so stated a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Whether Mr. Desper’s allegations that prison officials permitted visitation between similarly situated individuals and their minor children, while denying him the same opportunity, stated a plausible claim for a violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held, consistent with the Supreme Court’s finding in Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), that the “freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with incarceration,” so there is no constitutional right to prison visitation for either prisoners or visitors. To grant Desper this right, would ignore the rationale for his confinement, directly related to sexual misconduct with a minor. Fourth Circuit also found that Desper failed to prove that VDOC “arbitrarily” denied Desper’s visitation rights given that the denial only occurred following two consecutive failed mental health evaluations. Regarding his Due Process claim, Fourth Circuit again found that, as a prison inmate, Desper is not guaranteed the same rights to a “parent-child relationship” as a parent outside of prison, and his complaint proved that Due Process of law had been followed by demonstrating the measures VDOC took to review his claim. Finally, regarding his Equal Protection claim, Fourth Circuit held that Desper was not treated differently than his fellow inmates who were also sex-offenders but not denied visitation because the exception to Operating Procedure 851.1 required inmates to pass a mental health evaluation: where Desper failed, other inmates passed and were accordingly grated visitation. Both Desper and the other inmates, though, were offered the same opportunity to gain visitation rights back through the exception process. For these reasons, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Desper’s complaint.

Earle v. Shreves (19-6655)

Question Presented

Whether Mr. Earle can recover damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for a claim that prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances.
Whether the district court improperly granted summary judgment on Mr. Earle’s First Amendment retaliation claim when there was a genuine dispute of fact regarding the causal relationship between the grievances he filed and the adverse actions defendants took against him.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants without allowing discovery.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only applied to federal, and not state, officials for individuals seeking monetary damages from officials who had violated their constitutional rights. Moving on to the summary judgement, Bivens did establish an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers violating an individual’s constitutional rights, but the Supreme Court’s stance on implied damage remedies has changed so that expanding the remedy is now “disfavored.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017). Fourth Circuit held that determining whether an implied damage remedy is available for a constitutional claim is a crucial threshold matter and may be more important than the actual merits of the claim itself. Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that in this specific case, given the changing landscape of implied damage remedies and the presence of “special factors counseling hesitation,” the Bivens remedy should not be extended to the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Therefore, the district court’s judgment to dismiss was affirmed.

Burke v. Clarke (19-6523)

Question Presented

Whether VDOC substantially burdened Mr. Burke’s religious rights in violation of the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA by placing Mr. Burke in segregated restrictive housing solely because he could not comply with VDOC’s grooming policy without violating his Rastafarian beliefs?
Whether VDOC treated Mr. Burke differently from similarly situated prisoners in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by segregating Mr. Burke in restrictive housing solely because of his Rastafarian faith and by denying Mr. Burke opportunities for religious worship that were provided to inmates of other faiths?

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit initially found that because Burke had successfully preserved his “impossible choice” (between violating his faith or enduring punitive segregation) argument for appeal, and his challenge was not moot because the VDOC retained the authority to revise the grooming policy every 3 years and might have reasonably returned to the discriminatory practice, Burke was allowed to bring forth a Free Exercise violation. Although the VDOC conceded that Burke’s religious beliefs were sincere, the Fourth Circuit held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for the First Amendment damages claim because no precedent “would have put a reasonable prison official on notice, at the time of the relevant events.” Gentry v. Robinson, ___ F. App’x ___, 2020 WL 7181318, at *6 (citing Hines v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 148 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 1998)). The district court dismissed the RLUIPA claim on its first prong–sincerely held belief–so they did not reach the second prong–substantial burden; because the VDOC conceded that Burke’s religious beliefs were sincere, however, Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the claim and remanded it for a completed analysis. Finally, Fourth Circuit held that Burke’s Equal Protection claim failed because Burke did not establish that he was treated differently from those similarly situated or that any unequal treatment was a direct result of intentional discrimination. In other words, Burke did not demonstrate that “VDOC applied the grooming policy to Burke because he was Rastafarian,” thus the grooming policy did not intentionally discriminate between Rastafarians and other prisoners; this part of the judgment was affirmed.

Tyree v. United States (18-7392)

Questions Presented

Mr. Tyree’s complaint alleges that officers did not arrive for more than ten minutes after an emergency alarm was triggered in his cell while he was being attacked by his cellmate, despite Bureau of Prisons policy requiring an immediate response to emergencies. Tyree suffered serious injuries as a result. Hence, the issue presented is whether the district court erred in granting a facial motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the “discretionary function” exception to the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit affirmed district court on conclusion that Bureau of Prison Program Statement fails to mandate a non-discretionary response to a duress alarm. Vacated and remanded on all other issues, with case to proceed to trial.

Smith v. Collins (18-7313)

Questions Presented

Whether Mr. Smith’s six-plus years in brutally restrictive segregated confinement with no path for release because of his religious beliefs implicates a due process liberty interest.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by granting judgment in favor of defendants after summarily denying Mr. Smith’s repeated motions to discover material evidence about his conditions of confinement and defendants’ intent to keep him in segregation indefinitely because of his religious beliefs.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). According to Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), and Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015), to establish an “atypical and significant hardship,” Fourth Circuit relied on three factors: (1) the magnitude of confinement restrictions, (2) the period of confinement being indefinite, and (3) the collateral consequences on an inmate’s sentence from confinement. Fourth Circuit found that Smith had presented evidence that demonstrated that both factors one and three were met. And, although Smith’s confinement period was not as long as other “substantial periods” of confinement that the Court had previously considered, Fourth Circuit held that a prisoner would not have to be in solitary confinement “for decades” in order to possess a “cognizable liberty interest.” Fourth Circuit found that Smith’s four year confinement period was enough to present at least a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Smith’s confinement presented an “atypical hardship.” Fourth Circuit accordingly vacated the district court’s summary judgment against Smith and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether Smith’s confinement was “constitutionally adequate” and whether the defendant-appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

Dean v. Jones (18-7227)

Questions Presented

This case concerns the summary judgment standard for prisoner excessive force claims brought under the Eighth Amendment. The specific questions presented are:

Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims related to the use of pepper spray, when a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Plaintiff was subdued by an officer and posed no threat and that an officer used the pepper spray maliciously as retaliation for an earlier physical altercation.
Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims relating to injuries he sustained in a separate incident in a janitorial closet, when a reasonable trier of fact could credit Plaintiff’s testimony that he was subdued by an officer and posed no threat, but nonetheless was severely beaten by multiple officers in retaliation for an earlier physical altercation.

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit held that there was genuine fact issue as to whether there was any need for officer to direct a sustained blast of pepper spray directly into inmate’s face while he was handcuffed and on his back. Court also held that factual issues precluded summary judgment for officer who kicked inmate while he was lying in closet with his arms handcuffed behind his back. Finally, court denied qualified immunity.

Carter v. United States (16-6411)

Questions Presented

Did the district court err in concluding that Mr. Carter suffered only de minimis physical injuries when he suffered chronic ankle injuries and neck pain that severely hampered his mobility and required numerous medical visits, a steroidal injection, an MRI, and potential surgery?
Does the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2), require Mr. Carter to show more than de minimis “physical injury” to recover damages for mental or emotional injury where, by its plain meaning, no such threshold exist?
Does the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C § 1346(b)(1), provide jurisdiction over claims alleging less than de minimis injury, as multiple circuits have held?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in two regards when dismissing Carter’s claim. First, the district court applied the “de minimis injury” threshold under § 1346(b)(2) to both Carter’s physical and emotional injury claims when it should only have been applied to the consideration of Carter’s emotional injuries. Second, the district court dismissed Carter’s emotional distress claim based on a Rule 12(b)(1) using jurisdictional fact-finding that “went directly to the merits of his suit” where jurisdictional facts that are intertwined with facts going towards the merits of a case preclude the court from deciding factual disputes under Rule 12(b)(1). Fourth Circuit held that because jurisdictional and meritorious facts were intertwined, Carter was entitled to a “presumption of truthfulness” on a motion to dismiss; accordingly, the district court should have simply assumed jurisdiction. Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 2015). Fourth Circuit therefore vacated the judgement of the district court that Carter failed to show physical injuries and remanded.

Robinson v. Clipse (08-6670)

Questions Presented

Tyrone Robinson timely filed this pro se § 1983 action alleging that trooper Joseph Clipse used excessive force when, during an arrest, he shot Robinson. The original complaint named the South Carolina Department of Public Safety, Highway Patrol (the state agency that employed Clipse) as the defendant. After the statute of limitations ran, Robinson amended the complaint to add Clipse as a defendant, but the district court, on summary judgment, held that the amendment did not relate back to the date of the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), and thus ruled that Robinson’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Did the district court err in applying Rule 15(c)?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit found that Robinson’s amended complaint asserted a claim that arose from the occurrence laid out in his original complaint. Fourth Circuit also found that the delay in Robinson’s in forma pauperis complaint should not have been penalized because the district court was the responsible for the delay, so the period of time before the district court authorized service should not count against Robinson for determining a limitation period on the complaint. After ruling that Clipse had been given proper notice, Fourth Circuit found that Clipse was also not prejudiced by the amended complaint, stating that, “had Clipse been named as a defendant in the original complaint, he would have been in the same position he is now.” Fourth Circuit concluded that Rule 15(c)’s requirements were satisfied, so Robinson’s amendment naming Clipse as the defendant “unquestionably” related back to his original complaint; the district court’s judgement was reversed and the case remanded.

Rendelman v. Rouse (08-6150)

Questions Presented

Defendants are prison officials who enforce a dietary program. Plaintiff, an Orthodox Jewish inmate, requested accommodations so he could adhere to kosher dietary laws. When Defendants denied his requests, he brought this action under RLUIPA. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding they demonstrated that the burden they imposed on Plaintiff’s religious exercise was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim?
Should this Court address in the first instance Defendants’ affirmative defense of qualified immunity? If so, are they entitled to qualified immunity?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Dismissed in part, Affirmed in part. Fourth Circuit found that Rendelman’s transfer out of MDOC custody made his claim for injunctive relief moot; it was accordingly dismissed. Further, a RLUIPA claim, when invoked as a spending clause statute, does not authorize a claim for monetary damages when an official is sued in their official capacity, and Congress did not “‘affirmatively impose[e]’ [the spending clause] ‘condition'” such that defendants could be pursued for monetary damages in an individual capacity either; Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgement that Rendelman was not entitled to monetary damages. Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006).

Section 1983 (Non-Prisoner)

Torres v. Ball (21-6447)

Questions Presented

Did material inconsistencies between Sergeant Ball’s post-arrest report, affidavit in support of summary judgment, and body camera footage preclude the District Court from granting summary judgment in Sergeant Ball’s favor?
Did Sergeant Ball have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop any green Honda based on a vague, bare-bones tip from a virtually anonymous informant that Mr. Torres, who had warrants out for his arrest, was driving a green Honda?

Clinic

New York University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit found that between Sergeant Ball’s report and affidavit there were two discrepancies in testimony: the first was referring to Torres as “staying” at a location versus “frequenting” it, and the second was referring to Torres’s vehicle as a “Honda car” versus a “Honda Accord.” Fourth Circuit found that neither instance presented a material inconsistency and were instead matters of semantics; further, the remainder of the descriptions were consistent between report and affidavit. Fourth Circuit also found that, Sergeant Ball was not required to corroborate the CI’s tip as the CI had provided accurate information to Sergeant Ball in the past, and Sergeant Ball did have sufficient justification to stop Torres based on both the tip and the fact that Sergeant Ball had observed Torres around a green Honda at the address provided by the informant. United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002). Finally, in accordance with the fourth amendment’s requirement for a legitimate traffic stop, Sergeant Ball acted within the scope of the stop, using “the least intrusive means possible” to confirm that Torres was in fact the suspect he was looking for.

Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City (20-2334)

Questions Presented

Is a decision to affirm a student’s suspension on the basis of a new charge, made directly by a school board with final decision-making authority under state law, a “policy” for purposes of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Did Appellant state a claim that the Respondent School Board’s decision violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part and reversed in part (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit held that School Board acted as the final policymaking authority in approving Starbuck’s suspension, so Monell did not bar suit. Court also held that Starbuck had pleaded plausible Fourth Amendment claim. Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims dismissed.

Covey v. Ohio County (13-1227)

Questions Presented

Have the Coveys stated a valid claim that law enforcement officers violated the Fourth Amendment when, in response to a tip that marijuana was believed to be in the back patio area of the Coveys’ home, the officers proceeded directly to the Coveys’ backyard and discovered the marijuana in the patio area, 2 without a warrant or consent to be there?
The tip on which those officers acted was reported to the sheriff by a county property tax assessor. The Coveys allege that, without their knowledge or consent and while they were away from home, the tax assessor opened the door of their home, and he examined the back patio area where he observed what he believed to be marijuana. Have the Coveys stated a valid claim that the tax assessor violated the Fourth Amendment?
Defendant Manchas argued below that Mr. Covey’s plea agreement should bar the Fourth Amendment claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), a contention the district court did not address. Does Mr. Covey’s plea agreement bar either Mrs. Covey or Mr. Covey from pursuing this action?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Fourth Circuit found that the officers’ defense was based on the “knock-and-talk” exception, which allows police officers to approach a home, knock, and engage in limited interaction. However, the officers, while searing for marijuana, entered the “curtilage” of the Coveys’ home–a walk-out basement patio area attached to their home–without justification, violating the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). Fourth Circuit also found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because they had clearly violated long established federal law, stating that the curtilage of a home is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. In regards to the defendants’ Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), claim, Fourth Circuit concluded that a valid conviction can still stand even after an improper search due to inevitable discovery or harmless error. Moreover, if the conviction is based on a guilty plea and the plaintiff did not plead facts inconsistent with guilt, a civil-rights claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. Some of Mr. Covey’s claims, however, such as allegations of false imprisonment and deprivation of liberty, would imply the conviction’s invalidity. Fourth Circuit found that application of Heck to former prisoners is not entirely clear, and the court left the determination of whether Heck bars any of Mr. Covey’s claims to the district court on remand. The court ultimately reversed the district court’s orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing some of Mr. Covey’s claims to proceed.

Labor & Employment Discrimination

Chapman v. Oakland Living Center (20-2361)

Questions Presented

Ms. Chapman testified that she felt compelled to resign her position at OLC after experiencing repeated racial insults from the minor child of her supervisor, who failed to appropriately address these incidents. The district court held that OLC cannot be held responsible, and that the supervisor’s conduct was reasonable, as a matter of law. The court also held that Ms. Chapman cannot make out a constructive discharge claim because the child was a third party and there is no evidence that OLC subjectively wanted her to resign. The issues presented are:

Was there a triable issue concerning whether OLC’s response to the August 2018 incident was negligent?
Was there a triable issue concerning whether OLC is liable, either in negligence or vicariously, for failing to prevent the harassment?
Did the district court err in holding that a constructive discharge claim requires proof that the employer subjectively wanted the employee to quit, and that a constructive discharge cannot be based on the actions of a third party?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed, vacated, and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit vacated award of summary judgment to defendant. Court held that there were triable issues of material fact in case regarding racial harassment and other discrimination perpetrated against plaintiff.

Britt v. DeJoy (20-1620)

Question Presented

When a dismissal without prejudice by the district court is final, and thus appealable, granting the appellate court jurisdiction to hear the case.

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Retained Jurisdiction (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, followed the lead of both the D.C. and Sixth Circuits when it abandoned its old case-by-case evaluation method to adopt a new “bright-line rule” that required a district court’s dismissal to be seen as final–thus appealable–when the district court dismissed a case without providing the plaintiff leave to amend. Fourth Circuit found that this new rule prevented it from speculating as to the district court’s meaning of “without prejudice.” Fourth Circuit therefore found that it had jurisdiction to hear Britt’s case given that the district court dismissed her discrimination claim without prejudice and without leave to amend.

Kelly v. City of Alexandria (20-1083)

Questions Presented

Anthony Kelly sued the City of Alexandria alleging racial discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The City then moved to dismiss Kelly’s amended complaint, arguing that Kelly’s Title VII suit was untimely. Kelly opposed that motion. He also moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. Among other things, Kelly’s proposed second amended complaint added claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and three City officers in their individual capacities and pleaded facts that would, in Kelly’s view, support a claim of equitable tolling of any time bar on his Title VII claims, which were filed in court no more than two minutes late. The morning after Kelly moved for leave to amend, the district court held the Title VII claims untimely and denied leave to amend, stating, without explanation, that the proposed amendment would be “futile.” The issues presented are:

Whether the district court erred in denying Kelly’s motion to amend his complaint as futile.
Whether the district court erred in holding Kelly’s Title VII claims untimely.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held no reversible error.

Bazemore v. Best Buy (18-2196)

Question Presented

Did Erika Bazemore state a plausible hostile work environment claim against her employer, Best Buy, when she alleged that a coworker targeted her with the slur “Ni***r T**s” in public and that Best Buy’s response was inadequate?

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit found that Bazemore failed to state a Title VII claim. Because Creel was Bazemore’s coworker and not her supervisor, Bazemore would have had to show that Best Buy knew about Creel’s harassment and chose not to do anything about it; they did, however, provide Creel with a written warning, and human resources was in contact with Bazemore. Fourth Circuit found Bazemore’s dissatisfaction with Creels’ punishment to be irrelevant because a Title VII violation does not prescribe a specific punishment for the employer to carry out.

Balbed v. Eden Park Guest House (17-1187)

Questions Presented

Whether 29 C.F.R. § 785.23, concerning the presumptive number of hours an employee is deemed to have worked in certain circumstances under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), overrides all other statutory requirements and regulations that govern the employer-employee relationship under the Act. Additional independent issues include whether:
1. An employer may count room and board in calculating minimum wage under the FLSA even though it failed to keep records of their cost, as the FLSA and its regulations require.
2. An employer may count housing provided in violation of local law as wages under the FLSA.
3. An employer may, in calculating minimum wage under the FLSA, count the purported retail value of room and board—including profit margin—rather than the actual cost to the employer of providing the items.
4. The particular agreement at issue here was a “reasonable agreement” under 29 C.F.R. § 785.23.
Whether the district court erred in dismissing the state-law claims without considering whether 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 impliedly preempts the requirement under Maryland wage-and-hour law that an employee be paid the minimum wage for each hour she works (and, where applicable, for overtime).

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit held that 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 applied to employment agreement.

Lyons v. Johns Hopkins Hospital (17-1037)

Questions Presented

This case presents three issues.

The first issue involves the ADA’s current drug-user exception, 42 U.S.C. § 12114, which excludes an employee from the Act’s protections where (1) the employee is “currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs,” (2) the employer acts “on the basis of such use,” and (3) the employee does not meet any of the safe-harbor provisions in the exception. The first issue is whether a disabled employee who tested positive for drug use once, more than four months before the employer fired him for not extending his medical leave, is excluded from the ADA’s protections.
Whether a person exhausted the administrative remedies for a retaliation claim when, among other things, his EEOC charge alleged that his employer terminated him instead of responding to his request for an accommodation.
Whether a plaintiff who alleges that his employer retaliated against him and learns for the first time in discovery that this employer had taken additional adverse actions against him around the same time as the alleged retaliation may bring a claim in federal court based on the newly discovered facts without amending his EEOC charge.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that Lyons was a current drug user, not covered by the ADA and EEOC did not raise retaliation claims.

Habeas

Timms v. US Atty. Gen (22-6338)

Questions Presented

Whether the Attorney General’s ultra vires actions—repeatedly moving Mr. Timms from a facility suitable for civil commitment into penal incarceration and then returning him to civil commitment— violates Mr. Timms’ due process rights.
Whether that due process claim needed to be exhausted in 18 U.S.C. § 4248 civil commitment proceedings that assess only whether a committed person is sexually dangerous.
Whether the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing Mr. Timms’ Fifth Amendment conditions of confinement claim when habeas provides his only remedy for this claim.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Pending.

Elijah v. Dunbar (21-7352)

Questions Presented

Whether Elijah’s objections to the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation were sufficiently specific to preserve his right to review.
Whether the Bureau of Prisons incorrectly denied Elijah good conduct time credit under the First Step Act for his original 108-month term of confinement.
Whether this Court should reconsider or reopen its denial of a certificate of appealability in Elijah’s prior 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, Fourth Circuit No. 20-7352.

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit found that the district court ought to review the magistrate’s recommendation de novo instead of for clear error. In accordance with Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2017), Fourth Circuit found that Elijah’s objections, under the Federal Magistrate Act, were not required to be “novel” in order to be sufficiently specific and that he was in fact alerting the district court to his belief that the magistrate judge had erred in recommending dismissal. Fourth Circuit rejected to consider the merits of Elijah’s habeas petition and resigned to the district court’s review of the magistrate’s recommendation. Finally, Fourth Circuit ruled that an argument that “the Court came to the wrong conclusion” does not constitute the level of contingency required to dismiss Elijah’s 2015 appeal.

US v. Slocum (21-7283)

Questions Presented

Whether Mr. Slocum’s counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to challenge the second superseding indictment, Counts 1 and 2, as multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause?
Whether Mr. Slocum’s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) convictions violate Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), because the second superseding indictment failed to allege all of the essential elements for those charges and therefore does not charge offenses against the United States?
Whether Mr. Slocum’s § 922(g)(1) convictions violate his Second Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Pending.

United States v. Manley (20-6812)

Questions Presented

This case primarily concerns where “extreme recklessness” crimes, such as depraved heart murder, qualify as crimes of violence. Also at issue is whether generic elements of assault and assault with a deadly weapon are crimes of violence under the categorical approach.

Whether a violent crime in aid of racketeering (“VICAR”) conviction premised on a violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51 is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s force clause.
Whether a VICAR conviction premised on second-degree murder under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32 qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s force clause?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that VICAR assault and VICAR murder include a mens rea more culpable than mere recklessness, thus satisfying the “crime of violence” element for 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Sanford v. Clarke (20-6712)

Questions Presented

Whether the State violated Habeas Rule 5 and the Rules of Civil Procedure by:
1. Not attaching mandatory records to its answer
2. Failing to serve Mr. Sanford records it had sent to the district court
Whether the proceedings below violated procedural due process given that the district court
1. Communicated ex parte with the State
2. Denied Mr. Sanford access to the records it relied on for its ruling
3. Potentially ruled on an incomplete record

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). In accordance with their ruling in Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2005), Fourth Circuit held that the requirements of Habeas Rule 5 were mandatory, and the district court did not have the discretion to relieve the state of abiding by Rule 5’s requirements.

Currica v. Miller (19-7638)

Questions Presented

Whether Mr. Currica’s plea was involuntary when no one told him that his plea exposed him to 90 years in prison despite the agreed upon 30 to 51 year sentencing guidelines range that was negotiated and emphasized throughout the plea proceedings.
Whether Mr. Currica is entitled to federal habeas relief when: (A) the state PCR court found that Mr. Currica was told that his sentencing guidelines range was advisory despite the transcript’s silence on that point; or (B) its decision directly contradicts clearly established law requiring that Mr. Currica be informed of the maximum sentence he faced.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. In accordance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which limits federal habeas relief federal courts can only grant relief if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or if the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Fourth Circuit found that Currica failed to prove that the PCR court had based their decision on “erroneous findings” and that there were multiple factors besides the plea court’s statements that contributed to Currica’s sentencing, so Currica’s singular complaint was not enough to “move the needle.” Fourth Circuit concluded that the state court’s decision wasn’t unreasonable, and Currica’s claims did not meet the stringent criteria required for federal habeas relief. As a result, Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Currica’s request for post-conviction relief.

Wright v. Clarke (19-7447)

Questions Presented

Petitioner’s trial attorney acquiesced to a jury instruction on an uncharged crime—grand larceny from the person—under the mistaken belief that it was a lesser-included offense for the charged crime of robbery. Counsel apparently wanted to give the jury the option of a lighter sentence. The Virginia Supreme Court held that counsel was not constitutionally ineffective because of that tactical objective. The issues presented are:

Whether the Virginia Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny?
Whether any part of that claim is procedurally defaulted?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit held that Supreme Court of Virginia applied incorrect legal standard, that trial counsel’s performance was inadequate, and that there was a reasonable probability of prejudice.

United States v. Crawley (19-7369)

Question Presented

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Crawley’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate the sentence for his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction given that the conviction relied upon the invalid predicate offense of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit found that Crawley’s admission to attempting to steal half a kilogram of cocaine was enough to sustain a § 924(c) offense predicated upon a drug trafficking crime; in other words, it was not necessary for Crawley to also admit to an intent to distribute the cocaine after the robbery. Crawley attempted to argue that the district court engaged in improper fact-finding, but, unlike Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), Crawley admitted to operative facts in his plea agreement, and the district court did not increase his maximum or minimum sentence based on legally extraneous facts. Fourth Circuit further held that Crawley’s plea agreement “unambiguously state[d]” that he pled guilty to both predicate offenses, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence and drug trafficking which the statement of facts supported.

Crockett v. Clarke (19-6636)

Questions Presented

Whether Mr. Crockett’s trial counsel’s failure to present expert forensic testimony that would have substantially undermined the Commonwealth of Virginia’s circumstantial case prejudiced Mr. Crockett’s defense at his criminal trial.
Whether, at minimum, the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Crockett’s request for an opportunity to present that expert forensic testimony—along with evidence of the effect it would have had on the jury—at an evidentiary hearing.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit began by noting that for federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the burden to prove wrongful detention and/or ineffective assistance of counsel id extremely high, and two avenues were provided for relief under § 2254(d)(1) and § 2254(d)(2). Fourth Circuit found that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s determination that Crockett’s counsel “fell below the standard of care” but did not create a prejudicial outcome for Crockett was both based on a “totality of the evidence” and a well explained opinion; therefore, it was not an unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Crockett’s § 2254 petition and denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing, citing AEDPA’s demanding standard that requires respect and deference to state court decisions, even if reasonable jurists could disagree with them. Further noting that the admittance of the “Pape Report” would likely not have outweighed the other evidence against Crockett.

Wall v. Kiser (19-6524)

Questions Presented

Whether Virginia prison disciplinary authorities deprived Mr. Wall of due process by revoking 270 days of accrued good-time credits without reviewing–as Mr. Wall repeatedly requested–potentially exculpatory video evidence of the underlying incident.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), established that new procedural rules cannot be applied to cases that have already been finalized and are no longer subject to direct review. Fourth Circuit also addressed Wall’s fairness argument, explaining that federal habeas courts are available to provide relief even when there is no available state corrective process. Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld the “non-retroactivity principle” of Teague, emphasizing the importance of finality and the integrity of the judicial process with respect to state proceedings. Applying new procedural rules retroactively would impose significant burdens on the criminal justice system, impair the deterrence effect of criminal law, and undermine the reliance on prior law by prison officials. Therefore, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Wall habeas relief.

Goodman v. Diggs (18-7315)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court improperly ignored Mr. Goodman’s sworn allegations of malicious, serious physical abuse by jail officials and therefore erred in granting summary judgment against his Eighth Amendment claim.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to act on Mr. Goodman’s repeated motions to discover specific evidence that would corroborate the alleged abuse and demonstrate a material factual dispute between his sworn allegations and jail officials’ contrary version of events.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning in Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2017), when it held that a “superseded verified complaint still put forward live factual allegations with evidentiary value” and did not remove the original complaint’s value as an affidavit. Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Goodman’s complaint should have been recognized as an affidavit. Fourth Circuit accordingly held that because Goodman’s complaints were verified and created a genuine issue of material fact, the district court erred in failing to consider them. Fourth Circuit also held that the district court erred when it granted summary judgement to the officers before conducting sufficient discovery. For these reasons, Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case, instructing the district court to resolve Goodman’s discovery request before taking a “fresh look” at the officer’s summary judgement motion.

US v. Harper (18-7147)

Questions Presented

Whether sentencing counsel and appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance in conceding that the North Carolina offense of second-degree kidnapping is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Opening

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). US filed to remand after Harper filed his opening brief.

Bowling v. Virginia Department of Corrections (18-6170)

Questions Presented

Did Bowling plausibly allege that the Virginia Parole Board violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider his diminished criminal culpability and his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation in prison when deciding whether to grant parole?
Is Bowling entitled to a new parole review because the Virginia Parole Board arbitrarily deprived him of his due process liberty interest when it denied him parole under guidelines for adults that do not account for his diminished criminal culpability as a juvenile offender and his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation in prison?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Regarding his Eighth Amendment claim, Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on juvenile offenders affected Bowling’s case, ultimately concluding that his claims went beyond the scope of the existing legal framework and declined to extend the protections of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In the procedural due process section, Fourth Circuit found that Bowling did not possess a “state-created liberty interest” in parole, and thus, his claims were properly dismissed. Consequently, Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Barnes v. Masters (17-6073)

Questions Presented

Did the district court err in concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), the statute governing the Bureau of Prisons’ award of prior custody credits, precludes implementation of a sentencing court’s U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) order imposing a concurrent federal sentence that runs from the start of a preexisting undischarged state sentence?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit found that when a defendant is already serving an undischarged prison term, the sentencing court can choose to make the new federal sentence run concurrently with the existing one, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). However, the sentencing court’s discretion is guided by U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), which specifies the circumstances under which a defendant may receive a concurrent sentence. Barnes argued that this guideline allowed the court to impose a fully retroactively concurrent sentence, meaning that both sentences would start on the same date. Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, emphasizing that a federal sentence cannot begin before it is imposed and cannot run concurrently with an undischarged term in a way that conflicts with statutory limitations. Fourth Circuit further held that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has the exclusive authority to calculate prior custody credit, not the sentencing court. The district court’s decision to deny the defendant’s petition was affirmed based on these principles.

US v. McNeill (12-6129)

Questions Presented

Whether a federal inmate satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s one-year statute of limitations when he deposits his motion, with prepaid first-class postage, in the prison’s internal mailing system within the limitations period, notwithstanding that he addressed it to the wrong federal district court.
Whether a federal inmate’s mailing of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, within the limitations period but addressed to the wrong federal district court, equitably tolls the statute of limitations when, despite the inmate’s diligent efforts to confirm the status of his filing, circumstances beyond the inmate’s control prevented its physical filing in any court during the limitations period.

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Fourth Circuit found that the prison mailbox rule should apply to McNeill’s case, so long as he mailed the petition before the end of the applicable limitations period, because there are many more factors that are out of control to a pro se prisoner than a non pro se litigant and/or a litigant not imprisoned. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). Fourth Circuit held that the district denied McNeill’s motion prematurely because they had not completed a “basic factual inquiry” to determine a “time-certain record of McNeill’s mailings.” Fourth Circuit also held that the need for transfer, from one district court to another because of an incorrect address, did not affect the timing principle of the prison mailbox rule where, and only where, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 mandated transfer “in the interest of justice,” which in this case was true. Fourth Circuit accordingly reversed the decision of the district court denying McNeill’s motion to accept the petition and remanded for the district court to complete a factual finding that McNeill both (1) mailed his petition before the statute of limitations ran and (2) that he sent it to a court bound by § 1631.

Singleton v. Eagleton (09-7701)

Questions Presented

Did the district court err in rejecting Petitioner’s federal habeas claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial counsel, who was retained more than three years after Petitioner was first charged and only eleven days before Petitioner was tried in absentia, (1) failed to consult with Petitioner about his right to appeal, (2) erroneously advised Petitioner that he could not appeal from his conviction because he had been tried in absentia, and (3) failed to file a notice of appeal to preserve Petitioner’s constitutional right to a review of his conviction?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit found that the state PCR court’s factual finding that Singleton did not instruct counsel to file an appeal was not “rebutted by clear and convincing evidence” in Singleton’s briefs and therefore must be accepted as true. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Fourth Circuit held that Singleton was not entitled to habeas relief because he did not prove that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file an appeal as instructed. Further, Singleton failed to present to the state court evidence that he had exhausted a “failure-to-consult claim” in accordance with Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). He also failed to assert that he had been prevented from a meritorious appeal on the basis of counsel’s failure to consult Singleton; Fourth Circuit found the claim to be procedurally defaulted on federal habeas review. The district court’s denial of Singleton’s habeas petition was affirmed.

Rice v. Rivera (08-8191, 09-6001)

Questions Presented

Petitioner was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for “using” a firearm “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime” based on evidence that he reached instinctively toward a handgun lying on the night stand next to his bed when police officers kicked in his bedroom door and awakened him. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court decided Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Petitioner subsequently sought habeas corpus relief from his conviction under § 924(c)(1) on the ground that he had not actively employed the firearm as required by Bailey. Respondent agreed that Petitioner was entitled to the relief sought. Did the district court err in denying the petition?
The district court also found that Petitioner’s conviction could be upheld under the “carry” prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) based on the same evidence. Did the district court err in light of the Supreme Court’s construction of that provision in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Denied, Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Because Rice did not satisfy the requirement under Jones, that the law change happen before his first § 2255 motion, he was not entitled to pursue relief under § 2241. Because of this, Fourth Circuit held that the district court should have dismissed his motion for lack of jurisdiction and subsequently reversed and remanded Rice’s habeas motion. Fourth Circuit also denied Rice’s request to file a second § 2255 motion. Fourth Circuit also found that there was no evidence to support that the Government exercised bad faith in pursuing the motion to vacate and a simple disagreement with Rice and the Government on the merits of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), was not enough to warrant the district court’s denial of a Rule 48 motion. For this reason, the denial was reversed. Overall, Fourth Circuit ordered that the district court’s opinion on the habeas claim be reversed for lack of jurisdiction, the second § 2255 motion be denied and remanded for the dismissal of the habeas motion, and that the denial of the motion to vacate be reversed and remanded for approval.

Sumner v. Davis (08-6570)

Questions Presented

When appellate counsel’s procedural error wholly precluded consideration of an issue on direct appeal, is prejudice presumed?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not unreasonably applied federal law by concluding that Sumner failed to demonstrate prejudice, the second requirement under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Fourth Circuit further held that a court was not required to consider “performance” and “prejudice” if the defendant “makes an insufficient showing on one.” Fourth Circuit found that Sumner’s counsel’s performance was better characterized as “deficient performance” or “error” as opposed to prejudice because Sumner did not suffer complete forfeiture of appellate proceedings. Accordingly, the judgement of the district court denying Sumner’s habeas petition was affirmed.

Criminal

United States v. Brown (21-7752)

Question Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion by finding that the risk to Mr. Brown’s life posed by his obesity, high blood pressure, and chronic bronchitis did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.
Whether the district court erroneously disregarded, for failure to exhaust, Mr. Brown’s § 924(c) claim that the disparity between his 30-year stacked sentence and the 10-year sentence he would receive under current law constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.
Whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to reweigh the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors that favor release, including the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities, the lack of need for the sentence imposed, and Mr. Brown’s post-sentencing conduct.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Fourth Circuit held that, generally, a sentencing court cannot modify a prison term once it has been imposed unless there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting such a reduction. Mr. Brown’s case involved two central contentions: the risk posed by COVID-19 and his disproportionately long sentence for two § 924(c) offenses. Fourth Circuit found that the risk of COVID-19 did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release in Mr. Brown’s case. It agreed, however, that the district court should have granted Brown’s motion based on his disproportionately long sentence. Specifically, the court found that the length of Mr. Brown’s sentence and the “gross disparity” between his sentence and sentences imposed for similar offenses created “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for reducing his sentence in accordance with sentencing factor 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 285 (4th Cir. 2020). Therefore, Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial and remanded with instructions to grant Mr. Brown’s motion for compassionate release and reduce his prison sentence.

United States v. Garcia (20-6075)

Question Presented

Did the District Court incorrectly decide that Mr. Garcia was sentenced in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act, and was therefore ineligible for relief under the First Step Act, by looking only at his sentencing date, when the record demonstrates that the Sentencing Court did not consider how the Fair Sentencing Act lowered the statutory penalty range for the amount of cocaine base involved in Mr. Garcia’s offense?

Clinic

Washington University Appellate Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Fourth Circuit held that Garcia had already been sentenced in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act, as he was sentenced in December 2012 which was six months after the Supreme Court clarified that the Fair Sentencing Act applies retroactively in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), so Garcia was ineligible for a sentence reduction. Further, Fourth Circuit found that Garcia’s sentence would remain the same because while the cocaine base object of the conspiracy fell under a “covered offense,” neither the powder cocaine nor the marijuana objects did.