D.C. Circuit

Prisoner Plaintiff

Ladeairous v. Garland (21-5119)

Questions Presented

Whether Mr. Ladeairous’s pro se filings constitute a timely filed Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) motion that would entitle him to reopen the time to appeal.
Whether Mr. Ladeairous’s allegations—that the Inspector General violated the PATRIOT Act’s clear terms by failing to designate an official to receive complaints of abuses by Department of Justice officials—set forth a justiciable mandamus claim.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Dismissed. DC Circuit held that Ladeairous’s response to the district court’s show-cause order cannot be combined with a notice of appeal to serve as a substitute for a motion to extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal. In cases involving the United States or its officers, parties have a strict 60-day time limit from the district court’s judgment to file an appeal, and this time limit is jurisdictional. If this time limit is not met, the court has no power to hear the appeal, even if there are compelling reasons. DC Circuit held that Ladeairous did not request the district court to extend or reopen the time to file a notice of appeal, and only the district court has the authority to provide that relief. DC Circuit accordingly dismissed Ladeairous’s appeal as untimely and concluded by addressing an argument regarding when the 60-day clock should start, affirming that it should run from the entry of the judgment, not when the party received the judgment.

Reid v. Hurwitz (17-5012)

Question Presented

Whether the district court erred in ruling on a mootness argument presented for the first time in BOP’s reply to its motion to dismiss without providing Mr. Reid notice of his right to respond.
Whether Mr. Reid’s claim for declaratory relief challenging BOP’s ongoing policy of the remains a live controversy even after his transfer out of the Special Housing Units that initially gave rise to his claims.
Whether the consistent and ongoing threat of re-designation to SHU brings Mr. Reid’s claims within mootness exceptions.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Under Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), courts can hear claims that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” This exception applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before it ends, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. DC Circuit rejected the argument that a stricter plausibility standard should have been applied to the Reid’s claims at the motion to dismiss stage. It pointed out that it is impossible for a plaintiff, when initially filing a complaint, to make plausible allegations that support a mootness exception. DC Circuit found that Reid’s claims were found to meet the criteria for a Spencer exception. First, he adequately alleged that the challenged actions were of such short duration that they couldn’t be fully litigated before ending. Second, he reasonably expected to be subjected to the same challenged conditions in the future based on a pattern of BOP’s actions and policies. The decision of the district court to dismiss Reid’s complaint on the grounds of mootness was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Price v. United States Dept. of Justice (15-5314)

Question Presented

Whether the statutory right to request executive agency records under the Freedom of Information Act can be waived by the terms of a plea agreement.
Assuming the FOIA waiver is valid, whether the district court erred in finding that the waiver covered all of Price’s FOIA requests without first inspecting the withheld documents in camera or requiring the Government to describe them with sufficient specificity to establish that the waiver covered the requested information.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). DC Circuit held that there was no a legitimate criminal justice interest in including a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) waiver in Price’s plea agreement; therefore, the potential harm to public policy and justice outweighs the benefits. DC Circuit clarified, however, that FOIA waivers in plea agreements are not always unenforceable. Price’s second argument was not addressed because the waiver was found to be invalid. As a result, DC Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Section 1983 (Non-Prisoner)

Atherton v. DC Office of the Mayor (07-5195)

Question Presented

Whether Atherton was unlawfully removed from grand jury service because of his deliberative judgments and his Hispanic ethnicity

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Result

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Regarding the absolute immunity claim put forth by the district court, DC Circuit held that neither the juror officer, Suzanne Bailey-Jones, nor the supervising AUSA, Daniel Zachem, are entitled to absolute immunity for their roles in dismissing a grand juror: Bailey-Jones’s actions were considered administrative rather than judicial, and Zachem’s involvement did not relate to his role as a prosecutor, making them ineligible for absolute immunity. DC Circuit noted that absolute immunity is not extended automatically to all officials, especially when their actions do not fall within the scope of judicial or prosecutorial functions. While Atherton claimed that his removal from the grand jury was discriminatory based on his race or ethnicity, DC Circuit found that the factual allegations in Atherton’s complaint were insufficient to support his equal protection claims, and they reversed the District Court’s decision that Atherton had provided sufficient evidence to support an equal protections claim. DC Circuit similarly found that Atherton’s allegations did not demonstrate a conspiracy “motivated by class-based discriminatory animus,” and it affirmed the dismissal of these claims. DC Circuit held that it was up to the District Court to determine on remand whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity specifically regarding Atherton’s due process claim. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of § 1983 claims against the District of Columbia, clarifying that municipalities can only be liable for constitutional violations arising from official municipal policy, not through a “principle of respondeat superior.” Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

Employment Discrimination

Robinson v. Department of Homeland Security (22-5093)

Question Presented

Whether the 30-day filing period in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) establishes a jurisdictional rule or a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Pending.

Geter v. United States Government Publishing Office (20-5043)

Questions Presented

Did the district court err in holding that Appellant’s employer had no obligation to accommodate him with a temporary light-duty assignment, despite strong evidence that similarly-situated employees had been given such an accommodation, simply because temporary light-duty vacancies were not formally posted as job openings?
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Appellant’s retaliation claims because the record does not foreclose the possibility that some or all of the past employees that he claims received better treatment may have themselves engaged in similar protected conduct?

Clinic

University of Virginia Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. D.C. Circuit held that Geter’s request for accommodations based on his disability was not unlawfully denied because Geter failed to provide GPO with the reasonably requested medical documentation of his injury. D.C. Circuit then evaluated Geter’s retaliation claim, based on circumstantial evidence, with the “burden-shifting framework” set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework, D.C. Circuit found that GPO’s firing of Geter because he could not operate a truck without a CDL was legitimate, and it found that Geter provided no evidence that there was actually a retaliatory reason behind his firing. D.C. Circuit held that Geter’s lead theory failed to provide sufficient evidence that the other drivers that GPO provided temporary light-duty assignments for also lacked CDLs and were thus similarly situated to Geter; further, other employees that were similarly situated to him had previously engaged in “protected activity” according to ADA standards and were not fired for it.

Chambers v. District of Columbia (19-7098)

Questions Presented

Section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” on the basis of sex “with respect to” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 704(a) of the Act forbids an employer from discriminating against an individual because she has engaged in Title VII protected activity. Id. § 2000e-3(a).

The en banc Court directed the parties to address whether a discriminatory denial or forced acceptance of a job transfer is actionable under Title VII only when it causes “objectively tangible harm.” See Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). D.C. Circuit, en banc, overruled Brown v. Brody, 99 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Court held that an employer that transfers an employee or denies an employee’s transfer request because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Townsend v. United States (19-5259)

Question Presented

Whether the D.C. Circuit should overturn the adverse-employment-action doctrine, which significantly narrows Congress’s ban on employment discrimination.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

En Banc Petition

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). Parties agreed that reversal and remand was necessary in light of Chambers v. District of Columbia, 35 F.4th 870 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (en banc).

Wilson v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (16-1250)

Question Presented

Did the ALJ err in granting summary judgment to the Respondent, Jim Browning, in this case involving interference with the statutory rights of Michael Wilson, a representative of miners (“miners’ rep”), under §105(c)(1) of the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977 (“the Mine Act”); and in denying Wilson’s motion for summary judgment?
In granting summary judgment to Browning, did the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) view the facts in the light most favorable to Wilson, the nonmoving party?
Is summary judgment appropriate when the person charged with harassment/interference under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act does not justify his actions with a legitimate and substantial reason whose importance outweighs the harm caused to the exercise of protected rights?
Is it legally permissible under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act for a nonmanagement employee to berate a representative of miners, tell him to go home, and accuse him of trying to hurt the company – while the miners’ rep is performing his statutory duties – simply because that non-management employee does not have the authority to discipline the miners’ rep?
Is it legally permissible under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act for a nonmanagement employee to harass and berate a miners’ rep so long as he does it only once?
Is a non-management employee’s harassment of a miners’ rep somehow mitigated under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act because the harassment took place in front of several other employees (i.e., not in private)?
Is it permissible for an ALJ to consider that the representative of miners continued to act as a miners’ rep after an incident of harassment in concluding that the harassment committed by the non-management employee did not rise to the level of interference when, in fact, the miners’ rep had immediately filed an interference claim with MSHA against the hourly employee and the harasser had been disciplined by the mine operator for his conduct?
Does a non-management employee’s harassment of a representative of miners insulate him from liability under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act, whereas a management employee who engaged in the same conduct would be found liable for unlawful interference (i.e., is there a different legal standard for what constitutes “interference” under §105(c)(1) depending on whether the person charged with the unlawful conduct is a member of management or a nonmanagement employee?
Are various factual findings by the ALJ supported by substantial evidence?
What is the proper legal standard to be used in interference cases under §105(c)(1) of the Mine Act when the person alleging interference is a nonemployee representative of miners and the person alleged to have interfered with the statutory rights of the miners’ rep is an hourly (non-management) employee?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed (in Clinic’s Favor). In assessing whether interference with Wilson’s rights as a miners’ representative occurred, DC Circuit held that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly considered the totality of circumstances and the factors under Multi-Ad Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 255 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2001). Wilson’s arguments about Browning’s intentions and the isolated nature of the incident were not persuasive. DC Circuit found that the ALJ’s consideration of Browning’s status as an hourly employee was relevant in the context of “interference” as well as the ALJ’s consideration of the public setting of the incident as a mitigating factor. The ALJ erred, however, in considering Wilson’s continued work as a miners’ representative as a factor: DC Circuit held that this was contrary to the objective standard applied to interference cases. DC Circuit concluded that the ALJ correctly applied the summary decision standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wilson, and correctly determined that Browning’s conduct did not constitute “interference” under Section 105(c). The petition for review was denied.

Other Discrimination

Stafford v. George Washington University (22-7012)

Questions Presented

Whether a genuine dispute exists as to any material fact that, in violation of Title VI, GW was deliberately indifferent (a) to student-on-student harassment from Stafford’s tennis teammates, who directed abhorrent racist epithets toward him on a daily basis; and (b) to Stafford’s reports about teacher-on-student harassment from his coach, who singled out students of color based on their race and national origin.
Whether the statute of limitations for Title VI claims brought in the District of Columbia is three years, derived from D.C.’s general personal injury law, or one year, derived from D.C.’s Human Rights Act.
Whether, even under a one-year statute of limitations, Stafford states a timely student-on-student harassment claim under the continuing-violation doctrine.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Courts Immersion Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and remanded (in Clinic’s favor). D.C. Circuit held that the statute of limitations for Title VI claims was three years. Additional issues remanded because of genuine factual disputes.

Other Civil

Doherty v. Turner Broadcasting Systems (22-7072)

Questions Presented

Whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact that the W-2s Turner filed on Mr. Doherty’s behalf constituted fraudulent information returns, in contravention of 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a).
Whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact that Turner acted willfully, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a), when it included Mr. Doherty’s workers’ compensation payments as taxable income on his W-2s.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). In this case, there was a dispute over whether Turner Broadcasting Systems (TBS) filed false information returns (W-2s) regarding the amount paid to Doherty and whether TBS acted “willfully and fraudulently” in doing so. DC Circuit found that under § 7434, a plaintiff must prove three things, two of which were still in dispute: (1) whether or not TBS overstated Doherty’s taxable income and (2) whether or not TBS acted “willfully and fraudulently.” In order to resolve these factual issues, DC Circuit reinstated Doherty’s claim and reversed the lower court’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Radmanesh v. Iran (19-7121)

Questions Presented

Do Radmanesh’s allegations, taken as true for default-judgment purposes, constitute torture so as to invoke the FSIA’s terrorism exception to sovereign immunity?
Do Radmanesh’s allegations, taken as true for default-judgment purposes, constitute hostage-taking so as to invoke the FSIA’s terrorism exception to sovereign immunity?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed (in Clinic’s Favor). DC Circuit held that a district court may enter a default judgment against an absent foreign sovereign only if the plaintiff establishes their claim by evidence satisfactory to the court and demonstrates that foreign sovereign immunity is unavailable. The determination of whether the exception applies is subject to legal review. Radmanesh sought to invoke the terrorism exception, claiming that he was subjected to torture and hostage-taking by Iran. DC Circuit concluded that Radmanesh had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his experiences in Iran met the requirements of torture or hostage-taking as defined by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). As a result, DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the inapplicability of the terrorism exception to the FSIA.

Strange v. Iran (19-7083)

Questions Presented

Whether the Court should grant the petition to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) because it has jurisdiction, allowing it to decide whether Petitioners properly served Defendant Karzai pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) and whether Petitioners properly served Defendant Karzai via Twitter?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Dismissed (in Clinic’s Favor). DC Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984), did not provide a clear majority opinion on the issue of recertification, and the Parents’ reliance on it is not enough to establish a binding precedent. DC Circuit found that most other circuits have allowed recertification, with varying criteria for determining when recertification is appropriate. DC Circuit held that a district court may not utilize recertification to extend the ten-day deadline for filing a petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The jurisdictional nature of the filing period cannot be circumvented, and courts do not have the authority to create exceptions or extend statutory time limits for filing. DC Circuit concluded by dismissing the petition for permission to appeal in the case at hand due to the failure to file within the ten-day filing period specified by § 1292(b).

In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litigation (19-7058)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court’s “final approval order” of May 9, 2019, is a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 requiring class members to appeal immediately to preserve their rights.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2)(C)(ii) requires a court to consider “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member claims” before approving a settlement. May a court ignore Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(ii) and approve a settlement without considering this factor when the settlement provides no binding proposal for distributing any relief to the class?
Notice to the class leaves open the possibility that the entire settlement fund will be distributed to as yet-unnamed charities of the plaintiffs’ choosing, and the settlement provides no mechanism to receive notice or to object to any part of this yet undisclosed decision.
1. Does a settlement notice that leaves these material terms undisclosed before the objection deadline comply with due process and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23? E.g., Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. Does a settlement and settlement class certification that permits class counsel to choose to divert the entire settlement fund to its favorite charities at the expense of the class comply with Rule 23(a)(4), Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(e), and Rule 23(g)? E.g., Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047-48 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014).

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction. DC Circuit found that the district court’s settlement approval order was not final because it dismissed claims against only two of the four defendants involved in a consolidated action. This situation did not meet the requirements for a final judgment or a Rule 54(b) exception. DC Circuit held that the appealed order was not a final judgment, and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Maalouf v. Iran (18-7052)

Questions Presented

Whether the sua sponte dismissal of these cases on limitations grounds was consistent with precedent limiting judicial discretion to do so, and with this Court’s holdings that the limitations defense under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is not jurisdictional and is therefore waived if it is not raised by the defendant?
Whether the district court was correct in holding that these cases were untimely and were not “related” to another timely-filed action?
Whether the speculation by the court below about potential effects on this country’s foreign policy was justified in the circumstances, or whether it breached the wall of separation of powers set out in the Constitution?
Whether the district court was correct in its concern that permitting these cases to go forward would open “floodgates” that would permit “nearly endless litigation”?

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Reversed in part, Vacated in part, and Remanded. DC Circuit held that the only question that they had to consider was whether a federal court had discretion to sua sponte invoke the terrorism exception’s statute of limitations on behalf of defendants who had not entered an appearance or otherwise sought to respond to complaints against them. DC Circuit concluded that the district court erred in taking sua sponte action. Because DC Circuit held that the district court had no authority to act sua sponte in these cases, it did not consider the parties’ arguments concerning the courts’ exercise of its discretion, the timeliness of the complaints, or the denial of the Kinyua plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions. DC Circuit also took no position on the merits of the six cases. Because the district courts had no authority to take sua sponte action, their opinion was reversed, their dismissals vacated, and the case remanded.

Fraenkel v. Iran (17-7100)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court’s monetary award in this case is consistent with law and with awards made in similar cases.
Whether the district court properly relied on tort defenses such as contributory negligence or consent to reduce plaintiffs’ damages award, notwithstanding that this is a terrorism case involving the kidnapping and murder of a teenager coming home from school.
Whether the record supports the district court’s findings that plaintiffs consented to being victims of terrorism and were targeted because they are Israeli citizens.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). The Fraenkels focused on three arguments: improper considerations in solatium damages awards, misapplication of legal precedents, and deviation from precedent in determining damages. DC Circuit found merit in the first two contentions. DC Circuit also found that the district court erred in relying on the victim’s nationality and the assumption of risk when determining solatium damages. DC Circuit found that the district court’s judgment was not consistent with the applicable law, and the court should reassess damages. The Fraenkels argued that the District Court should have followed the precedent set in Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp. 2d 229 (D.D.C. 2006), which outlined solatium award baselines. DC Circuit disagreed, stating that district courts have discretion in determining damages, and not all cases follow the Heiser framework. Finally, DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s awards for pain-and-suffering and punitive damages and reversed and remanded their judgement on solatium damages.

Lesesne v. Doe (11-7120)

Questions Presented

Is statutory requirement 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) exhaustion administrative remedy of PLRA relevant or moot in scope of its statutory language, meaning?
Are appellee actions, inactions sufficiently extreme, outrageous to satisfy the subjective standard of deliberate indifference?
Is dismissal of claim for intentional infliction and emotional distress for failure to state a claim valid?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). DC Circuit held that the PLRA requirement that Lesesne exhaust his administrative remedies did not apply here because Lesesne was not a prisoner at the time he filed his complaint; therefore, summary judgement that he failed to exhaust his remedies was reversed. DC Circuit also found that neither of Lesesne’s briefs mentioned the IIED claim, and there was no argument provided for why the dismissal of it should be reversed; DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.

Boniface v. United States Homeland Security and TSA (09-1095)

Questions Presented

Has TSA engaged in impermissible retroactive rulemaking by making certain past criminal convictions “disqualifying offenses” that automatically bar an occupational license, see 15 C.F.R. § 1572.103?
Because the United States (through TSA) be permitted to rely on and give effect to Boniface’s 1975 conviction by barring him from renewing his HME, when the United Sates violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers in obtaining that conviction, rendering the underlying indictment without force or effect?
Did TSA fail to abide by its own regulations, act arbitrarily and capriciously, and deprive Boniface of procedural due process by converting his appeal into a waiver request without adequate notice?
Did TSA act arbitrarily and capriciously and without substantial evidence in deciding that Boniface is ineligible for a waiver of TSA’s security-threat determination?

Clinic

Duke Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). Regarding Boniface’s “disqualifying offenses” claim, DC Circuit agreed with TSA’s regulations, which defined a conviction as “any plea of guilty” or finding of guilt, finding that Boniface’s conviction constituted a disqualifying offense for the threat assessment regulation, rejecting his challenge to the validity of his 1975 conviction. On the “retroactivity” claim, DC Circuit ruled that TSA’s threat assessment regulation, which created an evidentiary presumption regarding disqualifying convictions predating the regulation, did not have an unauthorized retroactive effect. In accordance with Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 266 (1994), the regulation must have impaired the rights Boniface possessed when he acted; it did not. Finally, regarding TSA’s denial of a waiver, DC Circuit held that TSA’s handling of Boniface’s appeal as a request for a waiver was “arbitrary and capricious.” TSA had treated his appeal as a waiver request without notifying him, and this deprived him of the opportunity to submit evidence in support of a waiver. DC Circuit rejected the government’s arguments related to exhaustion and harmless error and remanded the case for TSA to consider Boniface’s request for a waiver and the evidence he might submit in support of it.

Habeas

United States v. Hayman (21-3044)

Questions Presented

Whether adequate consultation about the right to appeal required trial counsel to both:
1. Inform Mr. Hayman, an indigent client, that he had a constitutional right to an attorney on direct appeal where counsel was steering Mr. Hayman to instead seek relief through § 2255 proceedings that did not guarantee counsel; and
2. Inquire whether Mr. Hayman wanted to appeal beyond reminding Mr. Hayman post-sentencing about the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
Whether trial counsel had a duty to consult with Mr. Hayman about appeal where counsel knew of Mr. Hayman’s persistent dissatisfaction with the case’s outcome and gave Mr. Hayman postplea advice about plea withdrawal and § 2255 proceedings.
Whether trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal prejudiced Mr. Hayman.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both that their attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). When the defendant hasn’t explicitly instructed their counsel to file an appeal, they must demonstrate that counsel had a duty to consult with them about an appeal and that counsel failed to do so. Prejudice is shown by establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to consult about an appeal, the defendant would have timely appealed. DC Circuit held that there was no need to decide whether counsel’s failure to consult was deficient because, even if it were, Hayman failed to show that he was prejudiced by this behavior. DC Circuit also highlighted Hayman’s inability to specify the points he would raise on appeal, and the absence of any other substantial reasons to believe he would have appealed. Without showing prejudice, Hayman’s challenge to counsel’s conduct fails. The judgment of the district court denying Hayman’s motion to vacate his conviction was affirmed.

Sluss v. United States Dept. of Justice (16-5373)

Questions Presented

Whether the U.S.-Canada Treaty’s requirement that the Attorney General shall consider if transfer would be in the “best interests” of the transferee when deciding prisoner transfer requests provides a manageable standard for a court to review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Whether the district court erred in concluding that the Attorney General’s denial of Mr. Sluss’s transfer request was not an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act where the Attorney General provided no record demonstrating consideration of whether transfer was in Mr. Sluss’s best interests.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. The government argued that the treaty between the US and Canada was not self-executing, meaning it didn’t automatically have effect as domestic law and required legislation for enforcement. Sluss, on the other hand, argued that the Transfer Act was the source of domestic law governing the treaty’s provisions and that he had a cause of action. DC Circuit’s decision focused on whether the treaty provided a “law to apply” and whether it imposed limits on the Attorney General’s discretion in transfer decisions. DC Circuit concluded that there was enough law to apply from the treaty and that the Attorney General’s discretion was limited by the treaty’s purpose, which included prisoner rehabilitation. Therefore, the denial of Sluss’s transfer request was considered within the appropriate scope of discretion. DC Circuit held that the Treaty and Transfer Act allowed for judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision in Sluss’s case, and the denial of the transfer request was affirmed.

United States v. Aguiar (15-3027)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court erred in holding that Aguiar’s counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to challenge the closure of general voir dire and the almost week-long administration of individual voir dire, along with pretrial litigation, from inside a private backroom behind the courtroom.
Whether this Court may expand a COA to encompass an uncertified issue, either through a motion for reconsidering a special panel’s initial, interlocutory COA denial, or through the merit panel’s inherent authority to certify an issue.
If the answer to the second question is affirmative, then a third question is on review: Whether the district court erred in holding that Aguiar’s counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to warn Aguiar that, if he rejected the government’s plea offer, the government would respond—as it did—by stacking two 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charges against him, which would substantially enhance his mandatory minimum sentencing exposure.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). DC Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a public trial extends to the voir dire process. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). It states that the voir dire process is generally presumed to be public–with exceptions only when there is a “good cause” shown–and a closure must be narrow, necessary to protect interests, and the court must consider alternatives. Under Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), however, Aguiar failed to show that he was prejudiced by the voir dire proceedings being closed, so DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Aguiar had not met the requisite prejudice requirement. Regarding his ineffective counsel claim, DC Circuit argued that Aguiar may have had a reasonable probability of making a different decision had he been properly informed of the consequences of rejecting a plea offer, necessitating an evidentiary hearing. On these grounds, DC Circuit reversed and remanded.

Criminal

United States v. Calloway (22-3043)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Calloway’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the Government’s witness about her testimony, elicited on direct examination, that the D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences investigation did not affect her testimony or performance.
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of Mr. Calloway’s previous firearms conviction in an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prosecution in which the Government proceeded solely on an actual possession theory.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Affirmed. Calloway claimed that the court allowed the government to elicit testimony from Palmer, indicating that the DFS investigation and loss of accreditation didn’t affect her work, but then refused to allow the defense to explore this further on cross-examination. DC Circuit held that while the Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to cross-examine witnesses, it doesn’t require “unlimited cross-examination.” The court may limit it once a certain threshold level has been granted to the defendant. In this case, DC Circuit found that defense counsel had been given the opportunity to cross-examine Palmer sufficiently to appraise her motives and bias. Moreover, DC Circuit found that additional cross-examination wouldn’t significantly alter the jury’s impression of Palmer’s credibility. Regarding the admission of Calloway’s past convictions, DC Circuit held that any such error would have been harmless because the other evidence against Calloway was overwhelming. DC Circuit affirmed.

United States v. Shabazz (20-3088)

Questions Presented

Whether the district court’s abuse of discretion in relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, a policy statement governing compassionate release motions filed by “the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” to deny Mr. Shabazz’s compassionate release motion requires reversal.
Whether the district court’s abuse of discretion by failing to consider how COVID-19 heightens Mr. Shabazz’s need to care for his ailing mother who is incapable of living alone, requires reversal.

Clinic

Georgetown Appellate Litigation Clinic

Briefing

Result

Vacated and Remanded (in Clinic’s Favor). This case was decided on the briefs where DC Circuit held that under United States v. Long, No. 20-3064 (D.C. Cir. May 18, 2021), the district court’s opinion should be vacated and remanded for a reconsideration of Shabazz’s compassionate release application.